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Franchised businesses that oper-
ate from leased premises often se-
cure a restrictive covenant in the 
lease, a covenant that restricts the 
lessor's right to permit his nearby 
property to be used for businesses 
competitive with the lessee~s. 
These covenants are most com-
mon, and most useful, in shop-
ping center leases, where the 
covenant may· limit the number of 
competitors in a substantial com-
• 
• 
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.cat 
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mercial area. Because their purpose and effect is to limit the 
number of nearby competitors, restrictive lease covenants 
have often been challenged as unlawful under the common 
law' and under state2 and federal 3 antitrust laws. 
Antitrust challenges to restric~ive lease covenants are gen-
erally reviewed under section 1 of the Shern1an Act, 4 the 
prohibition on restraints of trade, where effect on price and 
competitive conditions can be tested under a rule of reason. 
Yet the main antitrust concen1 with these covenants is their 
• 
exclusion of competitors. Exclusion of competitors, though, 
is a problem traditionally associated with monopolies, and 
dealt with under section 2 of the Sherman Acts or other 
antimonopoly rules. Courts may implicitly be aware of this, 
for they have increasingly come to treat restrictive lease · 
covenants as if they posed a monopoly problem even while 
they purport to evaluate them under a rule of reason. As 
will be explained in this article, this judicial trend toward 
monopoly analysis is correct, and restrictive lease covenants 
should be treated for antitrust purposes under section 2 
rather than section 1. This article will explore the justifi-
cations for treating restrictive lease covenants as monopoly 
problems, as well as the ramifications of doing so. 
I. Problems in ·current Antitrust Treatment 
Restrictive lease covenants are "contracts in restraint of 
trade," as the term was understood in its pre-Sherrnan Act, 
common-law sense~6 Section 1 on its face prohibits every 
ucontract ... in restraint of trade or commerce. n It thus 
would appear obvious that restrictive lease covenants should 
be subject to section 1 's prohibition. 7 Yet early Sherman Act 
casesH excluded all restrictive covenants from section 1, and 
• 
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after some early antitrust challenges, attacks upon restric-
tive lease covenants prior to the 1960s rarely mentioned the 
antitrust laws.9 
In the 1960s and 1970s, when the FTC, the Justice De-
partment, and private litigants began to bring suit under 
section I to challenge restrictive lease covenants, there was 
no commonly accepted standard to test their validity. By 
default, they were treated as analogies of other, more fa-
miliar practices, and rules that had been developed for those 
other practices were applied uncritically to restrictive lease 
covenants. 
For example, the FTC and .some private plaintiffs tried 
unsuccessfully to classify shopping center lease restrictions as 
group refusals to deal, '0 illegal per se under the then-prevail-
ing rule of Klors.Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.•' Litigants 
also tried to classify them as price-fixing arrangementst 2 or 
as arrangements among co~petitors to allocate a market, u 
also illegal per se. In response to those challenges, law review 
writers and some courts urged that shopping centers were 
joint ventures, and that shopping center lease covenants of 
all kinds were "ancillary" restraints, whose validity was to 
be tested (depending on jurisprudential preference) by a 
multifactor rule of reason 14 or an economic market power 
test. 15 Still other courts analogized the covenants to exclu-
sive dealing arrangements and tested them for validity by 
examining ho\Y, if at all, the exclusion of the covenantee's 
competitors affected market conditions. 16 
This use of analogies is analytically unsound. Identifying 
the flaws will help show why restrictive lease covenants 
should not be treated under section 1. 
A. Distributional and Nondistributional Restraints 
Restrictive lease covenants have been analogized under sec-
tion 1 either to combinations of competitors or to distri-
butional restraints (i.e., horizontal or vertical restraints, 
respectively). They plainly are not combinations of com-
petitors, and arguments that they are have been far-fetched. 
But restrictive lease covenants are not distributional re-
straints either. A distributional restraint regulates or re-
stricts the manner of distribution of goods or services 
between two parties in a distributional relationship such as 
manufacturer-dealer or franchisor-franchisee. 17 Restrictive 
lease covenants, by contrast, are not pan of a distributional 
relationship. They are entered into by landowners (usually 
shopping center owners) and tenants, and the product re-
stricted by the covenant com.mercial rental space is not 
a product that the parties jointly distribute. Instead, it is a 
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product that the tenant uses in its business,. Hence, the les-
see is a consumer, not a distributor, of the restricted prod-
uct. 
Thus, treating restrictive lease covenants as if they were 
distributional restraints is flawed analogizing. The flaw is 
institutional, for antitrust jurisprudence has never tried to 
distinguish distributional from nondistributional re-
straints, 18 perhaps because the common law from which it 
derives never distinguished hthe purchaser who happens to 
be a dealer and the purchaser who buys for his own use." 19 
Yet, distributional and nondistributional restraints should 
be distinguished for purposes of antitrust analysis since they 
raise different antitrust concerns. 
Most significantly, distributional restraints i~voke the 
Sherrnan Act's policy of protecting the ability of busi-
nesses particularly small businesses to make their own 
decisions about pricing and other marketing matters.20 To 
Treating restrictive lease covenants as if 
they were distributional restraints is flawed 
analogizing. The flaw is institutional, for 
antitrust jurisprudence has never tried to 
distinguish distributional from nondistri-
butional restraints. 
• 
implement the policy, arrangements that unduly limit fran· 
chisees' or dealers' discretion to make day-to-day business 
decisions may be found unlawful under section l. But where 
the parties to an arrangement are in a supplier-consumer, 
rather than manufacturer-dealer, relationship, this concern 
will not necessarily be invoked. Restrictive lease covenants 
do not tend to interfere with the discretion of dealers or 
franchisees to make decisions about the marketing of their 
products. Thus, restrictive lease covenants should not blindly 
be tested for validity by rules that have been developed in 
substantial part to address the concern with protecting dealer 
marketing discretion. 
B. Isolated Transactions and Systems of Restraints 
Although restrictive covenants imposed by a landowner on 
a group of lessees or vendees can be used to create a market-
wide, or at least comprehensive, system of restraints,21 re-
strictive lease covenants cannot. Thus, they are challenged 
only as isolated restraints. Yet the practices subject to sec-
tion 1 are generally systems of restraints, and it is the system 
that is evaluated under the rule of reason. 
The distinction between isolated transactions anq sys-
tems of restraints can already be found in the case law. For 
example, isolated resale price maintenance agreements-
ones not part of a system of distribution so widespread as 
to amount to a combination were originally deemed valid, 
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enforceable, and of no aqtitrust concern.22 Even today, a 
vestige of the distinction endures, for antitrust law exempts 
some isolated transactions on th~ ground that their ''impact 
on competition would not ~e s~fficient to warrant the con· 
cern of antitrust law . .,2l 
Although the distinction is recognized, it is currently little 
applied. 24 Nonetheless, it is an important one, because the 
section 1 rule of reason h~s b~come a test of validity for 
systems of restraints, rather than isolated restraints. Indeed, 
a current forrnulation of the rule of reason which calls for 
. 
balancing the effects on interbrand and intrabrand 
competition2s clearly pr~supposes that the restraint is used 
systematically to reduce rivalry between dealers in a branded 
good or service. 
Because the r.ule of reason is a rule primarily for systems 
of restraints, it cannol uncritically be applied to single trans-
actions, such as restrictive lease covenants. It simply makes 
no sense to balance the effects on interbrand and intrabrand 
• 
competition caused by a restrictive covenant. Some other 
approacq to testing the validity of restrictive lease cove ... 
nants is needed. 
II. The Antitrust Concern Raised by the Covenants 
Restrictive lease covenants are of antitrust concern pri-
marily because they exclude competitors of the covenan-
tee. 26 In the rare cases where an antitrust challenge has 
succeeded, it has done so precisely because the covenant 
was found to have the effect of improperly excluding com· 
petitors.27 Even where the covenant has been upheld, the 
lack of exclusionary effect has been a consideration material 
to the decisions. 2·8 
Exclusion of competitors, however, is a problem tradi-
tionally associated with monopolies rather than with unrea-
sonable restraints of trade. 29 Thus, the antitrust problem 
. 
associated with restrictive l~ase covenants suggests that they 
should be dealt with unqer se~tion 2, which is expressly con-
• 
cemed with problems of monopoly. 
It may seem counterintuitive to deal with a classical con-
tract in restraint of trade as if it posed a monopoly problem, 
but in fact courts already appear to be groping toward just 
such an approach. To see this, it helps to compare one cur"'\ 
rent rule for the antitrust treatment of restrictive lease cov-
enants with the prevailing approach to antitrust treatment 
of exclusive dealing and requirements contracts. Those lat-
ter <.:on tracts are mainly dealt with under section 3 of the 
Clayton Act, 30 which prohibits certain arrangements where 
their effect is substantially to l~ssen competition or "tend 
to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." Since the 
Supreme Court's decision in Standard Oil Co. of California 
v. United States (Standard Stations), 31 the focus of antitrust 
concern with exclusive dealing and requirements contracts 
has been on their potential for exclusion of the seller's com-
petitors.32 Thus, in Standard Stations, the Court upheld the 
district court's finding that exclusive dealing contracts vi-
olated section 3 because they "denie(d] dealers opportunity 
• 
• 
to deal in the products of competing suppliers and ex-
clude[d] suppliers from access to the outlets controlled by 
those dealers. " 3J · 
. . 
The section 3 test for exclusive dealing and requirem~nts 
·contracts calls first for determination of the market in which 
exclusionary effects are to be analyzed.34 Then it calls for 
an assessment of such effects, by reference to factors such 
as duration of the contract or arrangement,35 extent of new 
entry into and interbrand competition within the market, 36 
and existence of significant actual or potential competitors 
that might be excluded.:n 
The section 3 test for the legality of exclusive dealing and 
requirements contracts38 is very similar to a test that has 
been emerging to ass.ess the validity of restrictive lease cov-
enants. That test requires examination of: 
• • ( 1) the relevant product and geographic markets, together with 
the showing of unreasonable impact upon competition in these 
markets, due to the restrictive covenant; (2) the availability of 
alternate sites for the entity excluded by the operation of such a 
covenant; (3) the significance of the competition eliminated by 
the exclusivity clause~ and whether present o.r future competitors 
were the parties excluded; ( 4) the scope of the restrictive cove ... 
nant and whether it varied depending on particular circum-
stances; and ( 5) the economic justificati9ns for the inclusion of 
the restrictive covenant in the lease. 3~ 
The similarity of the factors used in the two tests suggests 
that courts have an understanding, even if unarticulated, 
that both practices generate the same monopoly concerns. 
From an historical.prospective as well, there is nothing 
unorthodox in testing the validity of restrictive lease cove-
nants contracts in restraint of trade . by reference to their 
monopolistic effects. At common law, many contracts and 
combinations in restraint of trade were treated as present-
ing a monopoly problem. The common-law rule of reason 
• 
hinges upon "whethe.r the restraint is such as only to afford 
a fair protection of t~e interests of the party in favor of 
whom it is given and not s.o large as to interfere with the 
interest of the public."40 It was used to test the validity of 
all contracts and combinations in restraint of trade.41 But . . 
this so-called rule of reason is really a portmanteau test, 
combining a standard of reasonableness (in the fi.rst half) 
with a prohibition of monopoly (in the second half). The 
Sherman Act has separated the one rule into two, and left 
them to their separate development. Yet at common law, 
there was only one test, whose application in a given case 
might emphasize either component. In general, the less a 
restraint looked like an employee restriction, the less em-
phasis was given to the reasonableness standard, and the 
more to the antimonopoly test.42 Thus, for example, while 
poste·mployment covenants not to compete were tested for 
validity almost exclusively under the reasonableness stan-
dard, 4·3 lease and deed covenants were judged mainly under 
the antimonopoly rule. 44 Thus, at common law, those ... con-
tracts in restraint of trade" were indeed thought to create 
• 
primarily a monopoly problem. • •• 
• • .. . 
III. The Section 2 Analysis of Restrictive 
Lease Covenants 
As suggested above, the Sherntan Act rule of validity for 
restrictive lease covenants may already have begun to evolve 
into a monopoly-oriented standard like that used at com-
mon law, where the principal focus of analysis is· exclusion 
of competitors. In addition to this trend, recent cases have 
also begun to require significant market power on the part 
of the covenantee as a prerequisite to any finding of inva-
lidity of the covenant. 45 This requirement is an essential 
element of standard monopoly analysis. As a result, the pro-
posal here for treatment of restrictive lease covenants un-
der section 2 is not so much a break with current law as 
an extrapolation of current tendencies. The following dis· 
cussion attempts to outline the essential features of the pro-
posed section 2 treatment. 
A. Limits to Section 2 Liability 
There can be no liability for monopolization unless the 
alleged monopolizer has monopoly power: the power to ex~ 
elude competition or raise prices in a given market.46 Sim-
ilarly, there can be no liability for attempted monopolization 
unless the defendant has enough market power to create a 
• 
The section 3 test for the legality of exclu· 
sive dealing and requirements contracts 
• 
is very s.imilar to a test that has been 
emerging to assess the validity of restric· 
tive lease covenants. 
significant threat that he will achieve a monopoly. 47 Signif-
icant market power, however, is only a prerequisite for li~ 
. . 
abilitY.. Alone it is not enough, for what section 2 prohibits 
are abusive practices involving substantial market power:48 
the acquisition of (or attempt to acquire) monopoly power 
through anticompetitive means, and the anticompetitive 
exercise of market power already obtained.49 Given this lim-
itation on the scope of section 2 liability, it is easy to sec 
why restrictive lease covenants should seldom be found in· 
valid under the antitrust laws. 
Consider a straightforward case, whe.re a business enters 
into a restrictive lease covenant simultaneously with its en-
try into a market. so If the market is in its early stages of 
development, the covenantee may have an extremely large 
market share. No liability attaches merely for having a large 
market share. 51 Market power is required. But it is very un-
likely that a restrictive lease covenant will give the cove-
nantee monopoly power, the po~er to exclude competition 
from an entire market. The broadest covenant that could 
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practically be obtained would be one excluding competitors 
from a large, regional shopping mall. However, a regional 
shopping mall ordinarily does not constitute a geographic 
market,s2 and thus exclusion from the shopping center will 
not necessarily be exclusion fr~m the entire market. 
Even if a covenant were to afford the covenantee mOl\QP-
oly power in some rare case, this fact alone still should not 
create liability for monopolization .. Acquisition of monop-
oly power violates section 2 only where the monopoly power 
is acquired through anticompetitive practices in particu-
lar, through restraints of trade that violate section 1 .. ~~ Yet, 
as explained above, the isolated use of a restrictive lease 
covenant should not be deemed an anticompetitive practice 
in violation of section 1 .. 
Another way to understand why acquisition of monopoly 
power through a restrictive lease covenant54 should not vi-
A regional shopping mall ordinarily do's 
not constitute a geographic market, and 
thus exclusion from the shopping centelf 
will not necessarily be exclusion from the 
entire market. 
olate section 2 is to consider one of the principal arguments 
• 
that has been advanced, and accepted by courts, to justify 
the conclusion that restrictive lease covenants are not Pf' 
se violations of section 1. It is generally agreed that restric-
tive lease covenants, at least potentially, are Hconsistent with 
the public interest in economic development. [They] can 
induce tenants to establish stores and to enter into a partie.: 
ular marketplace, often then encouraging the entry of other, 
often smaller, merchants.nss Obviously, they can provide 
such an inducement only where they give the covenantee 
some measure of protection against competition. Thus, 
courts have effectively held that restrictive lease covenants 
are a competitively permissible means of excluding com-
petitors from a delimited area because the prospect of ex-
clusion of competition has the capacity to promote economic 
development, which itself may underrnine any monopoly. 
In this respect they are like patents, which, although they 
may potentially confer a temporary monopoly, are deemed 
sociatly beneficial precisely because the prospect of a tem-
porary monopoly itself has the capacity to induce innova-
tion and technological development. 56 
Patents, of course, are constitutionally sanctioned, and 
the antitrust law of patent monopolies is substantially influ-
enced by the sanction. Thus, one cannot blindly apply the 
law of patent monopoly to restrictive lease covenants, which 
are sanctioned only by judicially recognized public policy. 
Still, they are sanctioned, and for much the same rea~on that 
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patents are. It is thus reasonable to treat restrictive lease 
covenants, like patents, as legitimate means of acquiring 
temporary market power and to invalidate them (or to in-
validate their enforcement) only where the market power 
conferJTed is coupled with abusive practices .. 57 
B. Issues in Section 2 Analysis 
Thus, the ordinary use of a restrictive lease covenant 
should not result in section 2 liability. A few reported de-
cisions suggest the kinds of practices that may or may not 
lead to liability. 
A rare case involving abus~ of a monopoly obtained 
through a covenant is Texas & Pacific Coal Co. v. Lawson.~K 
In that case, the owner of a coal mining camp where two 
thousand people lived and worked leased a saloon on it~ 
property to an individual. The lease contained a restrictive 
covenant prohibiting the landowner from using its remain-
ing property (in effect. an entire town) for saloon purposes, 
or permitting such use. The owner also agreed, under the 
lease, to pay its employees by check, and to redeem those 
checks when they had been used to pay for liquor at the 
lessee's saloon. The apparent purpose of the arrangement 
was not only to confer on the lessee a monopoly in the sa-
loon business, but also t<> use the monopoly to uintluence 
[the] employees to squander_ their earnings in the Saloon.''59 
Similarly, in Stewart v. Stearns & Culver Lumber Co.,llo the 
owner of a large sawmill leased a general store to an indi-
vidual and entered into a restrictive covenant. The owner 
' 
agreed to pay its employees in "merchandise coupon," that 
could be redeemed only at the store. In both cases the courts 
invalida~ed the arraqgemen~. The cases suggest how ex~ 
treme the facts may haye to be in order for use of a restric-
tive lease covenant to constitute monopolization. 
A more recent case suggests how section 2's prohibitjon 
of attempted .monopolization might apply to enforcement 
of a restrictive lease covenant. In Countrie Butcher Shoppe, 
Inc. v. Foodarama Supermarkets, lnc., 61 a supermarket en-
tered into a lease for space in a shopping center where the 
plaintiff, a competing butcher shop, was located. The su-
per•narkel lease contained a restrictive covenant that pro-
hibited both leasing to new butcher shops and renewal of 
plaintifrs existin~ lease. Ten years later, when plaintiff 
sought to renew its lease, the landlord refused to do so be-
cause of the covenant. 62 Plaintiff could relocate within the 
' 
geographic market, but only at a cost so prohibitive as to 
make it impractical to do so. The court held that, while the 
restrictive covenant was valid to the extent it kept addi-
• 
• 
tional competitors out of the center, its enforcement so as 
to remove an existing comp~titor from the market violated 
section 1 of the Sherrnan Act. 
Apparently, ip Countrie Butcher, there were few butcher 
shops in ·the relevant geographic market, and the supermar-
ket, although not a monopolist, may have had some market · 
power .. If the superrnarket had the specific intent to monop-
olize, then if tqere were a substantial probability that en-
(continued on page 23) 
restrictive lease covenants 
(continued from page 6) 
forcement of the covenan~ would lead to a monopoly, it 
could have been found liable under section 2 for attempt to 
monopolize. But since there were other competitors outside 
the center and thus outside the reach of the covenant, it is 
unlikely that enforcement would create a monopoly. Thus, 
no violation of the Sherman Act should have been found. 63 
If restrictive lease covenants are to be treated under sec-
tion 2, a likely subject of litigation will be application of the 
essential facilities doctrine to shopping centers. Under the 
essential facilities doctrine, a firm which controls a facility 
essential to its competitors may be liable for monopoliza-
If restrictive lease covenants are to be 
treated under section 2, a likely subject of 
litigation will be application of the essen-
tial facilities doctrine to shopping centers. 
tion ifit denies its competitors access. 64 The doctrine is sim-
ply a prohibition on extending a monopoly from one market 
(the facility) to another market {the product or service pro-
duced from the facility) through refusals to deal. For ex-
ample, it has been applied to prohibit an electric utility that 
had a monopoly over long-distance transmission lines (the 
facility) from refusing to deliver electric power from other 
utilities over its long-distance lines. 65 
Under this doctrine, as applied to restrictive covenants 
in shopping center leases, enforcement of such a covenant 
(i.e .. , the refusal to deal) could be monopolizing conduct if 
( l) presence in the shopping center was essential to the op-
eration of the excluded competing business; (2) the shop-
ping center, as a place to do business, could not practically 
be duplicated by the excluded competitor; and (3) the ex-
cluded competitor could do business in the shopping center 
without interfering with the conduct of the covenantee's 
business. 60 The essential facilities doctrine has been applied 
to a shopping-center-like facility (a wholesale produce mar-
ket).t.7 It has also been applied to enforcement of a restric-
tive lease covenant (for a football stadium). 6'8 However, it 
is doubtful that courts will uphold challenges to restrictive 
shopping center lease covenants under this doctrine because 
they have uniformly rejected arguments that presence in a 
shopping center is essential to a retailer"s business. 69 
IV. Conclusion 
As a practical matter, accepting the proposal of this article 
may make only a small difference. Section 2 treatment would 
• 
result in the invalidation of very few restrictive lease cov .. 
enants. Yet, the number of restrictive lease covenants cur-
rently being invalidated under section 1 is already very small, 
and the difference between numbers invalidated under the 
two approaches likely would be slight. Still, section 2 analysis 
is simpler because lack of significant market power will be 
dispositive in most cases. It is also narrowly focused on the 
genuine antitrust concerns. For those reasons; monopoly 
analysis ought to be used instead of the rule of reason. 0 
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ordinary incident to enhance the value of the thing conveyed, is not within 
the Sheranan Act"). 
9. See, e.g., Hedrick v. Perry, 102 F.2d 802 (I Oth Cir. 1939); In re Hale 
Desk Co., 97 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1938). 
Publications Order Form 
The Forum on Franchising provides quality infor1nation in the area of franchise law. This order form presents 
titles of Course Materials which were prepared by the faculty of each Forum program. Each book contains 
outlines, checklists, forms, samples and articles. To obtain a set of Course Materials, please check the title you 
wish to order, complete this fornt, and return it with your payment to: 
Course Material Title 
0 Twelfth AnnUal Forum 
• 
Forum on Franchising 
American Bar Association 
750 North I.ake Shore Drive 
Chicago, Illinois 60611 
PC: 5620016 1989 
Price 
$110.00 
A two-volume text providing infomtation on mergers and acquisitions, drafting franchise agreements, rem-
edies in franchise disputes, registration and disclosure laws, franchise sales regulations, and franchising in 
the professions. Provides an outloc;>k on free trade agreements between U.S., Canada, and Europe. The second 
• 
volume focuses on offering circulars, trade secrets and copyright protection, antitrust issues, state taxation 
for franchisors, and trademark revision. Also included are tips on structuring international franchise agree-
ments, litigation strategies, accounting for the franchise lawyer, and alternative distribution methods . 
• 
0 Fundamentals of Franchising PC: 5620014 1989 $45.00 
• 
Text will assist lawyers, paralegals, and businesspersons in familiarizing themselves with the basic legal 
problems involved in representing franchisors and franchisees. Specific areas covered include antitrust, 
• 
disclosure, financing, registration, structure, and trademarks. 
0 Eleventh Annual Forum PC: 5620012 1988 $75.00 
This two-volume text contains updates of the Forum's Tenth Annual Forum. In addition to supplementing 
topics covered in the Tenth Annual Forum text, topics include: antitrust issues; arbitration issues; termi-
nationlnonrenewal of franchises; bankruptcy law and franchising; offering circulars; and discussions on past 
and future franchise relationships. · 
Yes! Please send me the publications noted. 
0 Check enclosed made payable to the 
American Bar Association. 
Total Dollar Amount: $, ___ _ 
Postage and Handling: $ 2.95 
Grand Total: $ ___ _ 
Allow 2 to 4 weeks for delivery. 
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10. Sa von Gas Stations supra note 1; Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer 
Regional Shopping Center, 308 F. Supp. 988, 994 (D.D.C.), affd, 429 F.2d 
206 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 85 F.T.C. 
• 
970 ( t 97 5 ); Elida, Inc. v. Haranor Realty Corp., I 77 Conn. 218, 413 A.2d 
1266 ( 1979). 
II. 359 u.s. 207 ( 1959). 
12. Boaanan's Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts .• Inc., 433 F. Supp. 343, 
349 (E. D. Mich. I 975); Optivision, Inc. v. Syracuse Shopping Center As-
socs., 472 F. Supp. 665, 676 (N.D.N.Y. 197'9). 
13. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 1 85 
(7th Cir. 1985); Eagle, Shopping Center Control: The Developer Beseiged, 
51 J. URB. L. 585 609-10 (1974). 
14. E.g .• Comment, The An'titrust Implications of Restrictive Covenants 
in Shopping Center Leases. 18 VILL. L.·Rev. 121 (1973); Rowley & Dono-
hoe. Antitrust Implications ofTenant Selection Practices in Regional Shop-
ping Centers: Dalmo Sales Co. v. Tysons Comer Regional Shopping Center, 
11 B.C. INDUS. & COMM'L L. REv. 899 ( 1970). 
15. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Ente,r., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190-91 (7th 
Cir. 1985); Dunafon v. Del. McDonald's Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1232 (W.O. 
Mo. 1988). 
16. Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Mkts., Inc., 587 F.2d 127 (3d 
Cir. 1978); Child World, Inc. v. South Towne Centre, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 
112 J, 1129 (S.D. Ohio 1986); Borman's Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts. 
Inc., 433 F. Supp. 343, 351 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See generally Handler & 
Lazaroff, Restraint of Trade and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 51 
N. Y .U. L. Rev. 669 ( 1982). 
17. For a catalog of nonprice distributional restraints, see Robinson, Re-
straints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of Goods, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 
254 ( 1960). 
18. For example, the same rule of legality applies to a system of exclusive 
dealing contracts used by a ntanufacturer with its dealers and to a single 
requirements contract between a supplier and a consumer of the goods sold. 
See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 ( 1961 ). 
19. Isaacs, The Dealer-Purchaser, 1 U. CtN. L. REv. 373, 373 ( 1927). 
20. Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust. 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1051, 
• 
1056-57 (1979); Gould & Yamey, Professor Bork on Vertical Price Fixing, 
76 YALE; L.J. 722, 723-24 (1967). See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 
145, 152-53 ( 1968). 
21. See. e.g .. Burdell v. Grandi, 152 Cal. 376, 923, 1022 ( 1907) (system 
ofdeed covenants). Cf Sar Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., 1976-l 
Trade Cas. (CCH) , 60,816 (C. D. Cal. 1 976) (system of posttennination. 
employee restraints). 
22. Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 
• (1911)~ John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1907), 
cert. dismissed. 212 U.S. 588 ( 1908); Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance. 32 
YALE L.J. 676, 677 n.9, 679 n.15 (1923). For other examples, some rela· 
tively recent, see Belk~Avery, Inc. v. Henry I. Siegel Co., 457 F. Supp. 
1330, 1335 (M.D. Ala. 1978); United States v. Uniroyal, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 
84, 93 (S.D.N.Y 1969); United States v. Kohler Co., 1953 Trade Cas. (CCH) 
11 6 7.453 at 68,289 (E. D. Pa. 1953); United States v. J.l. Case Co., 101 F. 
Supp. 856, 864-65 (D. Minn. 1952); United Stales v. Hudnut, 8 F.2d 1010, 
1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1925). 
23. Jefferso-n Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 ( 1984) 
(tying arrangements). See also United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 
596, 606 ( 1972) ("Congress did not intend to prohibit ... all contracts that 
might in some insignificant degree o.r attenuated sense restrain trade or 
competition,.). 
Moreover, some of the early antitrust cases on restrictive lease covenants 
held that their effects on interstate commerce were too limited to justify 
subjecting them to the antitrust laws. See Gaylord Shops~ Inc. v. Pittsburgh 
Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400, 
403 (W.D. Pa. 1963t Savon Gas Stations No. 6, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 203 
• 
F. Supp. 529, 534 (D. Md.), affd. 309 F.2d 306 (4th Cit. 1962), cert. denied. 
372 U.S. 91 I ( 1963)~ St. Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 
316 F. Supp. 1045. I 049 (D. Minn~ 1970). 
24. For a discussion of its virtual elimination in the law of retail price 
maintenance: see Conison, Retail Price Ceilings and the Rule of Reason, 8 
fRANCHISE L.J. 1 (Summer 1988). 
25. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) . 
26. See. e.g., Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Markets ·Jnc., 587 F.2d 
127 (3d Cir. 1978); Dunafon v. Del. McDonald's Corp., 691 F. Supp. 1232 
(W.O. Mo. 1 988). 
27. Pay Less Drug Stores Northwest, Inc. v. City Prods. Corp., 197 S-2 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 60,385 (D. Or. 1975); Countrie Butcher Shoppe, Inc. 
v. Foodarama Superntarkets, Inc., 1982 Trade Cas. (CCH) '1165,036 (E.D. 
Pa. 1982-83). 
28. 'Borman•s Inc. v. Great Scott Super Mkts., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 343, 
351 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Child World, Inc. v. South Towne Center, Ltd .• 634 
F. Supp. 1121, 1131 (S.D. Ohio 1986). 
29. See. e.g .• Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 ( 1911 ); Kales, 
Good & Bad Trusts. 30 HARV. L. REv. 830 (1917); Adler. Monopolizing at 
Common Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman Act. 31 HAR v. L. 
R.Ev. 246 ( 1917); Foulke, Restraints o.n Trade (Pt. 1), 12 CoLUM. l. Rev. 
97, 107-I 6 (1912). 
30. 15 u.s.c. § 14 (1982). 
31. 337 u.s. 293 {1949). 
32. Thus, a better comparison here would be of restrictive lease cove-
nants with exclusive supply and output contracts since they bind the supplier 
(lessor) and exclude competitors of the buyer (lessee). However, there is 
little case law on these practices. For a discussion of them, see Ill P. AREEDA 
& 0. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 11731 (1978). 
33. 337 U.S. at 298. Similar concern with the foreclosure of competition 
has been expressed by the Coun in subsequent decisions, Tampa Elec. Co. 
v. Nashville Coal Co .• 365 U.S. 320, 327-28 ( 1961 ); by lower federal courts. 
e.g .• Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., 724 F.2d 221, 236 (1st Cir. 
1983); Oos Santos v. Columbus-Cuneo-Cabrini Medical Center, 684 F.2d 
1346, 1352 (7th Cir. 1982); by the Federal Trade Commission, e.g., Beltone 
Elec. Corp., [ 1979-83 Transfer Binder) FTC Complaints and Orders (CCH) 
1121,934, at 22,387 (1982); and by various commentators, e.g.., Ill P. AREEDA 
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 4ft1)731-32 (1·978). 
. . 
34. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.~ 365 U.S. 320 ( 1961 ) . 
35. Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 
1291, 1305 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1009 (1982); Barry Wright 
Corp. v. ITI Grinell Corp., 724 F.2d at 237. 
36. Beltone Electronics Corp., ( 1979-83 Transfer Binder) FTC Com .. 
plaint and Orders at ,11 22,395-399; Magnus Petroleum Co. v. Skelly Oil 
Co., 599 F.2d 196,201-04 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 444 U.S. 916 (1979). 
37. Roland Machinery Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 749 F.2d 380, 394 
(7th Cir. 1984 ); Pueblo Aircraft Service, Inc. v. City of Pueblo, 498 F. Supp . 
12059 1212 (D. Colo. 1980), affd. 6 79 F.ld 805 (I Oth Cir. 1982), cert. de-
nied. 459 U.S. 1126 (1983). 
38. Clayton Act sectiQn 3 does not apply to real estate leases and so 
cannot be applied to restrictive lease covenants. 
39. Child World, Inc. v. South Towne Centre, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1121, 
1130-31 (S.D. Ohio 1986). 
40. Homer v. Graves, 7 Bing. 735, 743, 131 Eng. Rep. 284, 287 (C.P. 
1831 ). 
41. See Dewey, The Common-Law Background of Antitrust Policy. 41 
VA. L. Rev. 759, 771-83 (1955). The rule, with substantially the same for-
mulation, continues to be applied ~s a standard for validity of contracts. 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 128( 1 ). Nothing in the ar-
gument here would preclude continued application of the state-law stan-
dard to restrictive lease covenants. 
42. See, e.g., Tuscaloosa Ice Mfg. Co. v. Williams, 127 Ala. 110. 28 So. 
669~ 672 (1899) (covenant to cease doing business and not to compete) 
e'That a monopoly was created is clear beyond all dispute. That ends the 
case against the validity of the covenant") . 
43. See .. e.g .• HerreshofT v. Boutineau, 17 R.I. 3, 19 A. 112 ( 1890). 
44. See. e.g., Herpo1sheimer v. Funke, 1 Neb. 304, 9S N.W. 687 (1901); 
Vanoverv. Justice, 180 Ky~ 632,203 S.W. 321 (1918). 
45. Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters .• Inc .. 776 F.2d 185. 191 (7th 
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Cir. 1985)~ Ounafon v. Del. McDonald·s Corp .• 691 F. Supp. 1232 (W.O. 
Mo. 1988). 
46. United States v. Grinnel Corp .• 384 U.S. 563.570-71 (1966). 
47. Walker Proc. Equip .• Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chern. Corp .• 382 U.S. 
172 .. 177 ( 1965): Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704 .. 711 (7th 
Cir. 1979). c~rt. d~ni~d. 445 U .S. 917 ( 1980). 
48. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co ... 797 F.2d 370~ 
374 (7th Cir. 1986) .. cert. deni~d. 480 U.S. 934 ( 1987). 
49. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp .• 472 U.S. 585. 
595-96 ( 1985): Williamsburg Wax Muse\lm. Inc. v. Historic Figures. Inc .• 
8 I 0 F.2d 243. 252 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
50. See. e.g., Dunafon v. Del. McDonald's Corp .. 691 F. Supp. 1232 
(W.O. Mo. 1988). 
51. Metro Mobile CJS~ Inc. v. New Vector Communications. Inc .. 1989-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) , 68.878 (9th Cir. 1989) (I 00 percent market share 
during uheadstart period" did not establish market power); FDI, Inc. v. 
W.R. Grace & Co .. 1980-81 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 63,823 (C.D. Cal. 1980) 
( 100 percent share because first in n1arket but no market power). 
52. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc .. 587 F. Supp. 246. 
252 (C.D. Cal. 1984): Dunafon v. Del. ~1c0ona1d's Corp., 691 F. Supp. 
1232 (W .D. Mo. 1988): Deauville Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 1983-
2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65.599 at 68,983-85 .(S.D. Tex. 1983), affd in part 
and re,·'d in part on other grounds. 156 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1985). 
53. United States v. Griffith. 334 U.S. JOO, 106 (1948). 
Other anticompetitive practices that. where resulting in acquisition of 
monopoly power. create liability for monopolization are violations of Clay-
ton Act section 7 (relating to mergers) and violations of Clayton Act section 
3 (relating to tying and exclusive dealing). 
54. It must be emphasized that the discussion is limited to the case of 
isolated use of a restrictive lease covenant. 
annual forum summary 
(continued.from page 10) • 
chisor stop existing employees and franchisees from even-
tually competing with the franchisor using the franchisor's 
trade secrets? The first step the franchisor should take to 
protect his trade secrets is to use clear language in contracts 
with employees-and franchisees and then to identify those 
materials that the franchisor regards as trade secrets and to 
treat them as such. Trade secrets may include fortnulas, 
processes or techniques, marketing inforrnation, and cus-
tomer lists. Franchisors put a great deal of effort, for ex-
ample, into writing their franchise manuals. Much of the 
inforn1ation in these manuals is trade secret material that 
the franchisor would not want to fall into the hands of a 
competitor. In addition to taking steps to protect his trade 
secrets, should the franchisor register this copyright in the 
manual? Registration is necessary before the franchisor can 
bring an action for copyright infringement, registration prior 
to an infringement will allow for the recovery of statutory 
damages and attorney fees, and registration within five years 
of the first publication creates a presumption of copyright 
ownership. Copyright registration can also be done in a way 
that will protect the status of trade secrets. 
Workshop Q State Tax Problems for Franchisors (Neil 
D. Borden). In this workshop, Mr. Borden addressed the 
problems for franchisors in income tax liability in foreign 
• 
55. Child.World, Inc. v. South Towne Center. Ltd .. 634 F. Supp. 1121. 
1129 (S.D. Ohio 1986). 
56. Cf United Statesv. United Shoe Mach. Co .. 247 U.S. 32.51 (1918): 
Of course, there is restraint in a patent. Its strength is in the right to 
exclude others from the use of the invention .... This strength is the 
compensation which the law grants for the exercise of invention. 
57. Cf United States v. Line Mafl Co .. 333 U.S. 287. 308-10 (1948): 
Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States. 309 U.S. 436, 455-57 ( 1940). 
58. 34 S.W. 919 (Tex. 1896). Many of the facts are stated in the court's 
initial opinion. at 89 Tex. 394. 32 S. W. 871 (1895). 
59. 34 S.W .. at 920. 
60. 56 Fla. 570. 48 So. 19 ( 1908). 
61. 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 65.036 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
62. The facts are stated in the coun's prior opinion reported at 1982-1 
Trade Cas. (CCH) ~ 64.580 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
63. However. the butcher shop may have had a state law claim against 
the supennarket for interference with prospective contract. S~e RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 7668, 767. 
64. Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co .. 797 F.2d 370. 
376 (7th Cit. J 986). cert. denied. 480 U.S. 954 (1987). 
65. OtterTail Power Co. v. United States. 410 U.S. 366 (1973). 
66. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc .• 570 F.2d 982, 993 (D.C . Cir. I 977), cert. 
deni~d. 436 U.S. 956 ( 1978): Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing 
Co., 738 F.2d 1509. 1520 (lOth Cir. 1984). affd. 472 U.S. 585 ( 1985): Wil-
liamsburg Wax Museum. Inc. v. Historic Figures~ Inc .. 810 F.2d 243. 252 
(D.C. Cir. 1987). 
67. Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg .. Inc .. 194 F.2d 484 
(I st Cir.}, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 ( 1972). 
68. Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc .• 570 F.2d at 993. 
69. See cases cited supra at note 52. 
states, sales tax, and corporate personal property tax. Meth-
ods by which a franchisor could avoid taxation on income 
in foreign states were considered in detail. 
Workshop R Trademark Revision Brings Important 
Changes in the Law (Louis T. Pirkey and Dolores K. Hanna). 
This workshop explored the operative language and prac-
tical effect of the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988'1 
which became effective on November 16, 1989. The Act has 
made several important and significant changes to existing 
U.S. trademark law, which was embodied in the Trademark 
Act of 1946. The most significant change effected through 
the Act was the elimination of the requirement that a mark 
actually be used prior to the filing of an application for reg-
istration with the Patent and Trademark Office. The new 
Act perrnits the filing of an application for registration based 
upon an intent-to-use. Additionally, the Act eliminated the 
concept of "token use" for application purposes. The con-
cept of token use was disliked by regulators and legal coun-
sel as encouraging sham practices. The new intent-to-use 
aspect of the Act provides to potential trademark owners 
long-desired certainty in connection with their marketing 
plans for products or services and eliminates the token use 
fiction. To file an application based upon an intent to use 
a trademark, a bona fide intention to use must be demon-
strated to the Patent and Trademark Office. Within six 
months after the mark is published (and unopposed) and a 
notice of allowance is issued by the Patent and Trademark 
. 
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